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Congress reformed the procedures for amending the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1988 by prescribing greater public par-
ticipation in the rules revision process. Since that time, the Advi-
sory Committee on the Civil Rules, which has primary responsibil-
ity for studying the Rules and developing proposals for change in
them, has examined several important Rules and made controver-
sial recommendations for modifying those provisions.' Although
the Committee has assessed and suggested controversial revision in
summary judgment and discovery, this article analyzes recent ef-
forts of the Committee involving Rule 11, a provision that was fun-
damentally amended as recently as 1983.2
The Committee's work on Rule 11 has special relevance in
Montana because those with rule revising authority amended the
state analogue of Federal Rule 11 in 1984, ostensibly for the same
* Associate, Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C., Missoula, Montana.
** Professor of Law, University of Montana. Professor Tobias wishes to thank Mar-
garet Bentwood for valuable research, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for process-
ing this piece and the Harris Trust and the University of Montana School of Law for gener-
ous, continuing support. Errors that remain are the writers'.
1. The Advisory Committee (Committee) is a twelve-member body comprised of fed-
eral judges, law professors and practitioners, which Congress has authorized to study the
Federal Rules and to formulate proposals for change as indicated. See generally Lewis, The
Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1507 (1987); Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.L. REv. 795, 797 n.2 (1991).
The Standing Committee is a similarly constituted body that approves Advisory Com-
mittee proposals. In July, the Standing Committee authorized the Committee to solicit pub-
lic comment on its Rule 11 proposal after making minor modifications. Because these
changes are relatively unimportant and the original proposal is likely to resemble the Rule
that is adopted, we focus here on the Advisory Committee's efforts.
2. Federal Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an ap-
propriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or par-
ties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. II.
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reasons as the federal provision. Ironically, the federal entities with
rule amending responsibility are seriously considering additional
amendment of Rule 11 just as Montana judges, practitioners and
attorneys apparently have become accustomed to the 1984
provision.
Montana Rule 11 is modeled substantially on Federal Rule 11.
Revision and implementation of procedural rules in Montana seem
to track closely developments at the federal level, and significant
change in Federal Rule 11 now appears imminent. It is important,
therefore, to survey recent developments relating to Federal Rule
11, as they may well anticipate subsequent treatment of the corre-
sponding Montana provision.
The first section briefly describes the developments that led to
the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11 and to the 1984 revision of
Montana Rule 11. The second part analyzes implementation of the
Federal Rule that prompted the Advisory Committee to study the
provision and make suggestions for change. The third segment as-
sesses the Committee's study and its recommendations. Because
the proposals are nascent, the paper attempts to identify how they
will develop and what ultimately will result. The fourth section
briefly considers the consequences in the federal sphere for Mon-
tana Rule 11 and offers suggestions for revising the provision.
I. THE 1983 AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULE 11 AND THE 1984
AMENDMENT OF MONTANA RULE 11
A. Federal Rule 11
The developments that preceded the revision of Federal Rule
11 in 1983, and Montana Rule 11 in 1984, warrant only terse treat-
ment here, as most of them have been chronicled elsewhere.3 In
approximately 1975, the federal judiciary, led by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, and some writers began to assert that the federal
courts were undergoing a "litigation explosion."' 4 Numerous judges
and certain commentators claimed that the quantity of federal
3. See, e.g., Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1314-
17 (1986); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, Rule 11
Sanctions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 119 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need For Systematic Anticipation, in
THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Levin & R.
Wheeler ed. 1979). See generally Risinger, supra note 3, at 5-52 (pre-1975 history of Rule
11); Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 270, 287-96 (1989) (litigation explosion).
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civil lawsuits was increasing substantially and that too few of the
cases were meritorious.5 A number of the observers thought that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, enabled
parties and their counsel to abuse the process of litigation by, for
instance, manipulating the liberal, flexible pleading regime and
open-ended discovery for tactical benefit."
Most of these propositions were controversial in the mid-1970s
and still are.' Despite these difficulties and a dearth of relevant
empirical information, the Advisory Committee and the Supreme
Court recommended that Federal Rule 11 be substantially modi-
fied in 1983.8 Congress did not reject these suggestions, and revised
Rule 11 took effect in August 1983.1 The amended provision com-
manded judges to sanction lawyers and litigants who do not per-
form reasonable inquiries before they file papers or who tender the
documents for improper purposes.10 The drafters meant for new
Rule 11 to overcome the reluctance of attorneys and parties to seek
sanctions and of judges to grant them, reluctance that had permit-
ted initial Rule 11 to fall into disuse.1"
B. Montana Rule 11
Relevant developments in Montana closely followed those at
the federal level. When Montana adopted essentially intact the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1961, it promulgated a version
of Rule 11 that was equivalent to Federal Rule 11, promulgated in
5. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Marvell, Caseload
Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur
or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984).
7. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 288-89 (pertinent literature and efforts to resolve
some of controversy); Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485,
522-23 (1988/89) (same). There is little consensus about what is litigation abuse or what
would constitute a litigation explosion.
8. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2198-202 (1989).
9. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097, 1099-100
(1983). See generally A. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RUL.S OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984).
Rules 7, 16 and 26 were similarly and simultaneously amended and were intended to be an
integrated package.
10. See supra note 2.
11. Original Rule 11, promulgated in 1938, remained unchanged until 1983. It required
that bad faith be shown before sanctions could be imposed. This, and reluctance of lawyers
and judges to accuse attorneys of such conduct, allowed the Rule to fall into disuse. See
generally Risinger, supra note 3, at 34-42.
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1938.12
Those responsible for rule amendment in Montana found this
version of Rule 11 to be unsatisfactory for reasons quite similar to
those motivating the federal rule revision in 1983.13 These reasons
included the problems of litigation abuse, the reluctance of law-
yers, parties and judges to use the provision, and the need to
streamline the litigation process. 4 Indeed, the drafters subscribed
to a litany of reasons for revising Montana Rule 11 in 1984 that
was virtually identical to that recited by their federal counter-
parts. 5 The phrasing of Montana Rule 11 also mirrored the Fed-
eral Rule 11 that had been promulgated one year earlier.16
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL RULE 11
A. Rule 11's Early Application
Federal courts' implementation of the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11 made the provision the most controversial revision in the
half-century history of the Federal Rules. Judges inconsistently in-
terpreted the meaning of amended Rule l1's terms and inconsis-
tently applied the provision to similar factual circumstances.' 7 Re-
vised Rule 11 also prompted considerable, costly satellite litigation
involving, for instance, refined questions of the Rule's phrasing
and disputes over the magnitude of the sanctions imposed.'8
Much relevant evidence indicates that formal and informal
Rule 11 activity significantly disadvantaged and even chilled the
enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners. 9 Sanctions
12. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 11, MONT. CODE ANN. (1983). See generally MONT. R. Civ. P.
1-81, MONT. REV. CODES (1947) Vol. 7, at 888 (1964 Replacement); Mason, The Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1961); Comment, supra note 3, at 119-21.
13. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 11 annot. (Advisory Comm. Note) (1990). See generally
MONT. R. Civ. P. 11 annot. (Compilers Comment) (1990).
14. See MONT. R. Civ. P. 11 annot. (Advisory Comm. Note) (1990). See generally
MONT. R. Civ. P. 11 annot. (Compilers Comment) (1990).
15. Compare MONT. R. Civ. P. 11 annot. (Advisory Comm. Note) (1990) with FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Comm. Note), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-201 (1983).
16. The Montana Rule does not include one sentence that is in the Federal Rule: The
rule in equity that the averment of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testi-
mony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abol-
ished. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 2. See also MONT. R. Civ. P. 11.
17. See, e.g., Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990)
(comprehensive list of cases disagreeing whether Rule 11 imposes continuing duty). See
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1930.
18. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). See also Tobias, supra note 7, at 514.
19. We rely most here on Tobias, Reassessing Rule 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33
How. L.J. 161, 163 (1990); Tobias, supra note 7, at 490-507; Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Anal-
ysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
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motions were pursued, and granted, against these plaintiffs more
frequently than any other classification of federal civil litigant.20
Numerous courts vigorously enforced the provision's requirements
governing reasonable prefiling inquiries against civil rights litigants
and lawyers,2 and a small number of judges imposed sizeable sanc-
tions on the parties and attorneys.22 The inconsistencies described
above were particularly prevalent in civil rights actions.2 This im-
plementation of Rule 11 substantially disadvantaged civil rights
plaintiffs and their counsel, whose resource deficiencies can make
the litigants and lawyers risk averse. 4 Considerable evidence sug-
gests that these developments served to dissuade those who might
bring civil rights cases from instituting and zealously pursuing the
actions.25
B. Recent Improvements
During the last several years, there have been some improve-
ments relating to Federal Rule 11.26 All of the circuit courts of ap-
peal have published opinions that are solicitous of civil rights
plaintiffs and their counsel.2 7 A number- of these courts have
warned district judges that overly zealous application of Rule l's
prefiling inquiry commands or levying substantial sanctions could
have chilling effects on civil rights litigation.2 s
The formal enforcement of Federal Rule 11 by trial courts cor-
respondingly has improved. For example, some judges have denied
20. See Nelken, supra note 3, at 1327, 1340; Vairo, supra note 19, at 200-01.
21. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194
(7th Cir. 1985).
22. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989), afl'd, 932 F.2d 1572
(11th Cir. 1991) ($1,000,000 sanction).
23. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
24. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 495-98. This is not true of all civil rights plaintiffs and
lawyers, especially institutional litigants and attorneys, such as the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund.
25. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 503-06; Tobias, supra note 19, at 169-70. We recog-
nize that these contentions are controversial. See also Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Call For Written Comments on Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, as Amended in 1983, 131
F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments].
26. We rely most here on Tobias, supra note 19, at 166-71; Tobias, Rule 11 Re-*
calibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 122-23 (1991) and the primary sources
cited therein.
27. We are speaking in the remainder of this paragraph primarily to formal judicial
application rather than to informal Rule 11 activity.
28. See, e.g., Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990). Accord
Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.), reh'g granted, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1989); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988).
1991]
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
requests for sanctions filed against civil rights plaintiffs who were
proceeding pro se or were pursuing actions that appeared weak,
while a few courts refused to impose substantial sanctions on civil
rights litigants or lawyers who contravened the Rule.29
These apparent improvements in Rule 11 activity are subject
to certain qualifications. A number of critics have argued that nu-
merous judges have continued to exhibit insufficient solicitude for
civil rights plaintiffs or attorneys.3 0 Moreover, much of the im-
provement has involved formal Rule 11 activity; considerable ac-
tivity under the Rule that has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs
most substantially has been informal.3
C. Advisory Committee Decision to Study Rule 11
The Advisory Committee, in one of its two regularly scheduled
meetings during 1989, spent a half day discussing implementation
of Federal Rule 11.32 Two public interest representatives provided
evidence indicating that the Rule was adversely affecting civil
rights plaintiffs, and the Committee reached an informal agree-
ment to examine possible amendment of Rule 11.3
These deliberations and the developments evaluated above
eventually prompted the Committee to announce in August 1990
that it was commencing a study of amended Rule 11. 4 The Com-
mittee issued a Call for Comments, which sought written public
submissions on the Rule that were due in November 1990 and oral
testimony to be tendered at a hearing in New Orleans during Feb-
29. See, e.g., Tarka v. Time, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (pro se); Moore v.
Roth, No. 90 C 1097 (N.D. 111. Apr. 24, 1990) (1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4925) (same); Solberg
v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990) (apparently weak case); Summer v.
Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (same).
30. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Cruz v. Savage,
691 F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988), afl'd, 896 F.2d 626 (1st Cir. 1990). One significant
problem has been the failure to differentiate between product and conduct approaches to
Rule 11 decisionmaking. See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855
F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989),
aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991) ($1,000,000 sanction). See generally Tobias, supra note
19, at 168.
31. The informal activity is most detrimental because it is difficult to detect, docu-
ment, and have appellate courts alter. See generally Tobias, supra note 26, at 117.
32. The meeting, held in November, was one of the first opened to the public. See
generally Mullenix, supra note 1, at 854.
33. The individuals were Alan Morrison, Esq., of Public Citizen and Professor Laura
Macklin of the Georgetown Law Center Institute for Public Representation. See generally
Mullenix, supra note 1, at 854 n.310.
34. See Call for Comments, 131 F.R.D. 344 passim. See generally Mullenix, supra
note 1, at 854.
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ruary 1991.35 The Committee also requested that the Federal Judi-
cial Center (FJC) undertake an empirical analysis of Rule l1's op-
eration and stated that the Committee would evaluate all of the
material submitted and collected in determining whether to sug-
gest amendment of the Rule at its semi-annual spring session.3 6
Many persons and organizations responded to the Commit-
tee's Call for Comments on Rule l's operation.3 7 A majority of
those commenting criticized the Rule as written and as imple-
mented. The most significant objections were that the provision
promoted unnecessary satellite litigation, that courts inconsistently
construed and enforced Rule 11, and that Rule 11 activity detri-
mentally affected civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys.3 8
The individuals and groups that offered oral testimony at the
February public hearing afforded substantially similar observa-
tions.'9 They testified that Rule 11 fostered expensive satellite liti-
gation, was inconsistently applied and chilled the enthusiasm of
civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel.40
The FJC assembled and preliminarily assessed Rule 11 data
from five districts having computerized docket information and
trial judges' responses to a questionnaire and provided that mate-
rial to the Advisory Committee before the oral hearing.41 The FJC
made numerous tentative findings, several of which are pertinent
to this paper. Information collected from the five districts showed
that civil rights plaintiffs on the average were 2.6 times more likely
to be sanctioned than other litigants and that attorney's fees are
the preferable sanction for federal courts.42 Approximately four-
fifths of the district judges believed that litigation abuse was a mi-
nor problem, even as a similar number favored retaining the provi-
35. See Call for Comments, 131 F.R.D. at 345.
36. See id.
37. These comments are on file at the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, both in Washington, D.C.
38. This analysis is based on Professor Tobias' review of numerous written comments
and his discussions with a number of commentors.
39. See Transcript of Public Hearing on Rule 11, New Orleans, La. (Feb. 21, 1991)
(available from Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
40. This is premised on material in the Transcript, supra note 39, and telephone con-
versations with Thomas Willging and Elizabeth Wiggins, FJC Research Division (Feb. 26,
1991) and with Professors Melissa Nelken, Hastings College of the Law, and Georgene
Vairo, Fordham University School of Law, and witnesses at the hearing (Feb. 26, 1991). See
also .supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 27, 1991)
[hereinafter FJC REPORT].
42. See Summary of the Study of Rule 11 Cases in Five District Courts, in FJC RE-
PORT, supra note 41, at 9-15.
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sion essentially intact.43 The FJC also found that there was sub-
stantial variation in Rule l1's invocation across the country.
4
Indeed, the FJC confirmed other observers' statements that be-
tween 1983 and 1989 nearly forty percent of the reported Rule 11
decisions were issued in the Northern District of Illinois and the
Southern District of New York and that the Southern District of
New York accounted for some twenty-five percent of all reported
determinations.4 5
The Montana federal district is one of the districts with the
lowest incidence of Rule 11 activity nationwide. 46 This probably
reflects the local "legal culture" in which most lawyers and many
litigants know one another personally and are reluctant to jeopard-
ize continuing relationships and civility among attorneys, parties
and judges by invoking Rule 11. 41
Near the termination of the February public hearing, the Ad-
visory Committee decided that some change in amended Rule 11
was warranted, although it specifically rejected reinstitution of the
pre-1983 formulation.48 The Committee also asked that the FJC
refine several dimensions of the preliminary assessment that the
Center had performed. 49 Judge Sam Pointer of the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama, the Advisory Committee Chair, and Professor
Paul Carrington of Duke University School of Law, the Commit-
tee's Reporter, undertook the drafting of proposed modifications in
the Rule's text and its accompanying Advisory Committee Note.50
The Committee considered those suggestions at its semi-annual
43. See Summary of the Analysis of Judges' Responses to a Questionnaire on Rule
11, in FJC REPORT, supra note 41.
44. Statement of Thomas Willging at Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C.
(May 23, 1991).
45. Id. Accord Nelken, supra note 3, at 1326-27; Vairo, supra note 19, at 200.
46. Since August 1983, judges in the Montana federal district have published three
Rule 11 opinions. See Ostheimer v. Gall, CV No. 89-147-M-CCL (D. Mont. Feb. 6, 1991)
(1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1989); Lussy v. Haswell, 618 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Mont. 1985); Na-
tional Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mont. 1983),
rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Elks Nat'l Found. v. Weber, 942 F.2d 1480,
1485 (9th Cir. 1991). The judges also have issued Rule 11 warnings. See, e.g., First Nat'l
Bank v. Intermountain Bancorp., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mont. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 264
(9th Cir. 1988).
47. This is premised on conversations with numerous Montana practitioners. See gen-
erally Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1992).
48. This is premised on material in the Transcript, supra note 39, and the telephone
conversations, supra note 40.
49. The Committee especially wanted the FJC to refine information regarding sanc-
tioning in civil rights cases. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (FJC report in
response to Committee's requests given at May 23, 1991, Committee meeting).
50. The Committee Note is the document that accompanies the Rules and explains
their language and the reasons why the Committee proposed changes in the Rules.
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meeting on May 23 and 24, 1991.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S SUGGESTIONS
A. Report on Data Refinement
The researchers with primary responsibility for conducting the
FJC study reported to the Advisory Committee before it com-
menced discussion of the proposed recommendations for change in
Rule 11 and the Committee Note.51 The evaluators stated that re-
finement of the preliminary analysis yielded few new insights.52
The most important impression that their report left was that Rule
11 activity in civil rights litigation might be less problematic than
numerous civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers had asserted.
53
B. Specific Committee Proposals
The Advisory Committee proposed numerous specific changes
in Rule 11. The most important modifications will be analyzed in
terms of provision for violations of the Rule, the sanctions to be
imposed, and sanctioning on initiative of the court. A general as-
sessment will then be provided.
1. Specific Proposals
a. Rule Violations
Perhaps the most significant change relating to violations of
the Rule is the imposition of a "continuing duty" on lawyers and
pro se parties. The proposal provides that Rule 11 would be con-
travened "by presenting or maintaining a claim, defense, request,
demand, objection, contention or argument in" a paper submitted
to the court that violates certification requirements as to reasona-
ble inquiry.5 4
51. The stress that the Committee apparently placed on the studies and public com-
ment probably reflected sensitivity to the criticism that Rule l1's 1983 amendment was
based on inadequate data. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. Statements of Elizabeth Wiggins and Thomas Willging, FJC Research Division, at
Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington D.C. (May 23, 1991).
53. The paucity of later Committee discussion of civil rights suits left this impression,
although there were many references to concerns about the Rule's potential chilling effects.
See generally Mullenix, supra note 1, at 825; Tobias, supra note 19, at 165-66.
54. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), in Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Rules, 137 F.R.D. 53, 74-77
(1991) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. "The wording is sufficiently broad to cover the contin-
ued maintenance in federal court of totally meritless claims or defenses that were raised in
state court before removal." Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules,
supra, at 78.
1991]
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The first prong of existing Rule 11, regarding submissions for
improper purposes, would be retained essentially intact.5 5 The re-
quirements as to factual and legal representations are modified.
Attorneys and pro se parties would be required to certify that "any
allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support or, if specif-
ically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."5
Correspondingly, legal contentions must be "warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law."'57 The
major changes in the requirements covering factual assertions are
intended to make clear that plaintiffs are entitled to allege facts in
papers that may only be available with discovery and that parties
have a duty of candor to reveal assertions that do not have eviden-
tiary support.5 8 The principal modification in the requirements
pertaining to legal contentions is that arguments be "nonfrivo-
lous," rather than good faith contentions as currently required.5
The proposed changes in Rule l's text are problematic in nu-
merous ways. Most troubling is imposition of the continuing duty,
which represents a significant departure from current Rule 11 and
is a responsibility that most of the circuit courts addressing the
issue have declined to impose under the existing Rule.60
55. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 75-76.
The proposal essentially retains the idea that certification be to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information and belief after reasonable inquiry.
56. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76.
57. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76.
58. The Proposed Rule 11 Committee Notes state:
[T]he certification with respect to factual allegations and denials is revised in rec-
ognition that sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is
true or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or
third persons to gather and confirm evidentiary support for the allegation or de-
nial. . . . Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable op-
portunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a duty under the
rule to withdraw the allegation or denial.
Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 78-79.
Judge William Schwarzer initially articulated this duty of candor; however, the Ninth
Circuit refused to impose that obligation and reversed the lower court. See Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th
Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
59. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76. Com-
pare Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), supra, ("nonfrivolous") with FED. R. Civ. P. 11,
supra note 2 ("good faith").
60. The wording of current Rule 11 applies only to the initial signing of papers. Pro-
posed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 78. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11, supra note 2. See also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). Accord Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192,
1200-01 (7th Cir. 1990). The Committee Note specifically warned trial courts to test the
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The Advisory Committee's determination to propose the ongo-
ing updating of allegations included in papers seems inappropriate
for a number of practical and policy reasons. It will impose duties
that are onerous, and very difficult to satisfy, in nearly all types of
civil lawsuits. Requiring unrepresented parties and attorneys to
withdraw any "claim, defense, request, demand, objection, conten-
tion or argument in a pleading, written motion, or other paper"
immediately upon its becoming untenable is very burdensome."
The responsibility parses too precisely the idea of a paper, rather
than focusing on the paper as a whole as some courts have done. 2
Moreover, it would be quite difficult to monitor all assertions on a
continuing basis throughout discovery, to discern exactly that time
when they become untenable, so that such assertions may be
promptly withdrawn.63
The principal change in the requirements governing legal as-
sertions is that pro se litigants and attorneys cannot submit papers
that include nonfrivolous contentions urging the "extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
signer's conduct by asking "what was reasonable. . . at the time" the paper was signed and
to avoid using the "wisdom of hindsight." See FED. R Civ. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Note, 97
F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983).
Most circuit courts have declined to impose a continuing duty. Compare Dahnke v.
Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990) (no continuing duty); Corporation
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Associated
Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938, 943 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990)
(same); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(same); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Oliveri v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273-74 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) (same) with
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 393 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233
(1990) (continuing duty); Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991) (apparent recognition of continuing duty).
One panel of the Sixth Circuit, in Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Tay-
lor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9965 (6th Cir. 1989),
cast doubt on the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently
articulated in Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (continuing
duty). See also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922,
943 n.5 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (refusal to recognize continuing duty when issue not
briefed).
61. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 75.
62. See, e.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987); Vista Mfg., Inc. v. TRAC-4, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 140 (N.D. Ind. 1990). But see
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362-65 (9th Cir. 1990).
63. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991), is illustrative. The appellate court, by affirming the trial judge's
decision that certain of plaintiffs' allegations were frivolous after resolving a number of
credibility determinations against the litigants, essentially punished their counsel for pursu-
ing the precise credibility determinations that the adversary system is intended to afford.
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law." 4 Replacement of the term "good faith" with the phrase
"nonfrivolous" forfeits the advantage of familiar terminology,65
while it imports into the Rule a concept that courts have had diffi-
culty applying. Reliance on "frivolousness" overemphasizes the
merits of the case or the quality of the papers (product), rather
than the reasonableness of the prefiling inquiries (conduct).6
Courts correspondingly have experienced problems enunciating
consistent standards for ascertaining frivolousness-an idea intrin-
sically resistant to uniform definition-and affording sufficient
guidance to lawyers and litigants and adequate deterrence.67
The Advisory Committee also retained the abuse-of-discretion
standard for appellate review of all Rule 11 determinations that
the Supreme Court announced in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.68 Application of that standard in a number of major cases
suggests that it may be overly deferential, especially for review of
decisionmaking by trial courts that vigorously apply Rule 11. This
phenomenon is demonstrated by two recent panel opinions of the
Fourth Circuit, which sustained trial court findings that two of the
country's most respected civil rights attorneys had violated the
Rule in controversial cases.6 9 The Advisory Committee included
several new features in its proposal that may partially offset these
potential problems. The Committee provided in the new Rule's
text for a number of procedural protections, the most significant of
which is the concept of "safe harbors."7 0 The Committee intro-
64. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76.
65. Some Committee members favored the retention of "good faith" for that reason.
Statements of Professor Arthur Miller and Larrine S. Holbrooke, Esq., at Advisory Comm.
Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991).
66. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled
on other grounds by Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990);
Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D. Fla. 1989), reconsideration
denied, 729 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Neither the merits nor the papers are irrelevant,
although courts generally should consult them only after an attempt to ascertain whether
the prefiling inquiry was reasonable proves inconclusive. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 108
n.11. The continuing duty concept at least has the advantage of emphasizing conduct, al-
though it is vulnerable to criticism on other grounds. See supra notes 60-63 and accompany-
ing text.
67. See S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 20-21 (1989); Tobias, Certification and
Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 226 (1991). Even if the notion of frivolousness could be applied
more easily, it would impose higher standards generally and disadvantage parties who pur-
sue untested, unpopular or nontraditional theories specifically.
68. 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). The opinion clarified much lower court inconsistency
as to the proper standard of appellate review.
69. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607
(1991); Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
70. Safe harbors are measures, such as the ability to withdraw a violative assertion
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duced the safe harbor idea that permits movants to pursue sanc-
tions only after providing written notice to other parties of why
they believe that the litigant had violated the Rule and affording
the party an opportunity to withdraw the allegedly violative asser-
tion.71 One important benefit of the notice/safe harbor procedure is
that it will give offenders a "second chance," thereby reducing
Rule l's potential for chilling. 2 Insofar as the procedure works
properly, it also should foster prompt disposition of numerous con-
troversies involving particular allegations, thus decreasing the costs
of litigation for lawyers and clients and requiring minimal judicial
involvement. 3
Although application of this new concept probably would offer
some benefits, it is unclear precisely how advantageous the safe
harbor notion will be in practice. The procedure, particularly when
used in combination with the continuing duty idea, could burden
attorneys, parties, and courts in ways similar to the 1983 Rule, or
might introduce wholly new problems. The notice requirement is
subject to abuse through overuse, while numerous complications
could arise over the timing and clarity of notification and re-
sponses to notice. 4
Other specific procedures afforded in proposed Rule 11(c)
should constitute improvements. The requirements that courts
provide parties and attorneys notice and reasonable opportunity to
respond to sanctions motions and recite the behavior or circum-
stances that support the imposition of a sanction, if requested,
clarify exactly what procedures are available and warrant
adoption.7 5
b. Sanctions Imposed
The Advisory Committee had four principal goals when af-
fording courts guidance for effectuating their compulsory obliga-
tion to choose an appropriate sanction. 0 It apparently wished to
once notified of its insufficiency, that protect parties from sanctions.
71. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76-77.
72. See supra notes 23, 36, 38 and accompanying text (chilling effects).
73. When those notified properly withdraw challenged assertions, lawyers and litigants
would save expenses because a relatively informal motion could provide notice and vitiate
any need to spend resources on formal motions, and judges would spend no time treating
motions.
74. For example, the breadth and particularity of the reasons afforded why the offend-
ing assertion contravenes Rule 11 could be disputed.
75. The proposed change in requirements governing factual assertions, to recognize
the need for discovery in certain cases, is advisable. See supra notes 56, 58-59 and accompa-
nying text.
76. "[T]he court shall impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms,
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emphasize that Rule l1's major purpose is the deterrence of litiga-
tion abuse and to stress the availability of nonmonetary sanctions.
The Committee also seemed to think that judges had depended too
heavily on monetary awards, especially of attorneys' fees, as well as
Rule 11's compensatory purpose-all of which the Committee
meant to deemphasize. 7 Indications of the Committee's thinking
appear in the text of proposed Rule 11, in its Committee Notes,
and in the deliberations of the Committee. One telling example is
the call made twice in the Notes for judges to exercise greater re-
straint when considering the assessment of sanctions to deter vio-
lative behavior.7 s
One significant way that the Committee attempted to accom-
plish these objectives was in defining "appropriate sanction," a
phrase that was left nearly undefined in the current Rule.79 The
Committee agreed to the following formulation: An appropriate
sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter comparable
conduct by persons similarly situated."80
The Committee also tried to achieve these goals by expanding
on the definition of "appropriate sanction" in the sentence that
followed the one above:
[T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a non-
monetary nature, an order to pay a monetary penalty into court,
or, if imposed on motion, an order directing payment to the mo-
vant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
costs incurred as a direct result of the violation.8"
or parties determined. . . to be responsible for a violation .... " Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 76. Treatment here is organized differently than
above because the appropriate sanction concept was integral to the efforts of the Committee
and the goals were so significant. The goals described are not intended to be exhaustive.
77. The goals in this sentence and the preceding one are related but not mutually
exclusive. This is demonstrated by the Committee's acknowledgement that "[a] monetary
award may be the most effective deterrent in some circumstances. ... See Proposed Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 79.
78. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54,
at 79-80. An analogous example is the quoted language, supra note 77, while Committee
members afforded a number of similar examples in the Committee deliberations.
79. The 1983 amendment stated that such a sanction might include an opponent's
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note
2.
80. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 77. The
Committee rejected adoption of the idea that a sanction be the least severe adequate to
deter, a concept to which several circuit courts have subscribed. See In re Kunstler, 914
F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); White v. General Motors
Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freehold-
ers, 857 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New
Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1985).
81. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 77.
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Although the formulation would retain considerable wording used
in the current Rule,82 the Committee included several important
modifications. Most significant was explicit prescription in the new
Rule's text, before mentioning monetary sanctions, that "the sanc-
tion may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature
... .,sMoreover, the text expressly states that financial penal-
ties may be paid into court and that monetary penalties, constitut-
ing all of movants' unnecessary expenditures incurred, including
attorneys' fees, can be ordered."4
The phrasing that the Advisory Committee used in these two
sentences indicates that it meant to achieve the four objectives
stated above.85 The Committee Notes and the deliberations of the
Committee on May 23 and 24, 1991, explicate and reaffirm these
ideas and inform understanding of the group's thinking."8
The Committee Notes mention, and Committee members ob-
served, numerous times that deterrence of abuse is Rule l's prin-
cipal purpose. Perhaps most telling as to the respective emphasis
on deterrence and deemphasis of compensation was the Reporter's
observation that a significant aim of the Committee's efforts was to
"refocus sanctioning from compensation to deterrence. 8s7 The
Committee made clear in many ways its concern that judges sub-
stantially decrease the quantity and size of monetary sanctions, es-
pecially of attorney's fees, that had been levied under the present
Rule. 8 Most of the Committee members candidly admitted that
courts had treated monetary awards of fees as the "sanction of first
resort" and that excessive reliance on these types of sanctions had
led to the Rule's overuse and may have chilled certain litigants.8 9 A
82. Each articulation provides that a sanction may include an order to pay the ex-
penses, including attorney's fees, that the Rule violation caused the opponent to incur. See
id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 2.
83. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 77.
84. Id.
85. See text accompanying supra note 77 and sentence between text accompanying
supra notes 76 and 77. For instance, employment of the phrases "is sufficient" and "shall be
limited" and explicit inclusion of the word "deterrence" in the initial, definitional sentence
illustrate the four goals. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), in Proposed Rules, supra note
54, at 77.
86. Professor Tobias attended the Committee meetings and the material that follows
attempts to capture the Committee's thinking.
87. Statement of Professor Paul Carrington, Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (May 23, 1991).
88. This information is organized somewhat differently by treating material derived
from the meetings before information in the Committee Notes.
89. Committee members acknowledged that there were too many financial awards of
fees and too great a number that were too large. For instance, Judges William Bertelsman
and Mariana Pfaelzer observed that there had been a "widespread belief at the beginning"
of implementation of the 1983 version that the "normal sanction was to be fee shifting."
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number of members recommended that judges be discouraged
from invoking these forms of assessments. Judge Pointer observed
that the group was "trying to contract the fee-shifting possibili-
ties," while Judge William Bertelsman stated that the Committee
should "make clear that sanctions" were not primarily attorney's
fees.90
The Committee did not eliminate financial sanctions, even of
attorney's fees, but attempted to reduce reliance on them. The
Committee Notes explain that the Rule retains judicial authority
to award fees and that monetary awards may be the best deterrent
in certain situations.91 The Notes, however, limit in several impor-
tant ways those circumstances in which such sanctions will be
proper.2
The Committee provided several indications of its intent to
encourage courts to employ nonmonetary sanctions more fre-
quently. It expressly prescribed nonmonetary sanctions in the
Rule's text and placed it prior to financial assessments.9 3 The
Committee Notes explicitly state that judges can resort to a num-
ber of possible nonmonetary sanctions, enumerating a list of
them.9 4 The Committee decided against providing these specific
possibilities in the text principally because Judge Pointer deemed
that an inappropriate place for providing such guidance.9 5 This
Statements of Judges Bertelsman and Pfaelzer, Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C.
(May 23, 1991).
90. Statements of Judges Pointer and Bertelsman, Advisory Comm. Meeting, Wash-
ington, D.C. (May 23, 1991).
91. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54,
at 79-80. The Notes specifically stated that particularly for violations of the improper pur-
pose prong, payments to parties for injuries suffered would be better than payments into
court. Id. at 79.
92. Situations in which monetary awards and fee shifting are most appropriate, de-
scribed supra note 91 and accompanying text, are substantially qualified. Financial assess-
ments are to be employed in the service of deterrence, and contravention of the improper
purpose clause is the worst case scenario. The Notes impose other limits by stating that
reasonable fees not be actual ones and that partial reimbursement should adequately deter
lawyers and litigants with few resources. See id. See generally Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d
1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasonable fees need not be actual); White v. General Motors
Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (ability to pay significant equitable factor).
93. See Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991) (tapes of meeting
available from Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.); supra text accom-
panying note 81. "[FIor emphasis, [the Rule's text] does specifically note that sanctions may
be nonmonetary as well as monetary." Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Pro-
posed Rules, supra note 54, at 79.
94. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54,
at 79. These include "striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or
censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; . . . [and] refer-
ring [lawyers] to disciplinary authorities . . . ." Id.
95. Statements of Judge Pointer, Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May
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was true as well of a thorough listing of factors that courts are to
consider in ordering sanctions and selecting appropriate ones."
The comprehensive elaboration of factors should prove quite
valuable to judges in their efforts to choose proper sanctions.17 It is
less clear why those considerations apply to Rule violations, be-
cause the principal, if not the exclusive, decisional criteria should
be those specifically stated in the Rule's text.9 8
c. Sua Sponte Sanctions
The proposed Rule retains judicial authority to act on the
court's initiative when sanctioning but requires that judges follow
certain procedures while affording the targets of sanctions en-
hanced procedural protection. 9 Most important is the requirement
that courts issue show cause orders and provide reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond before they sanction litigants or lawyers. 100 The
Committee's inclusion of new procedural requirements in the pro-
posed Rule's text should clarify informal judicial invocation of cur-
rent Rule 11 that has been criticized. 10 These procedures should
constitute improvement, although they may be inadequate.102
23, 1991).
96. The Committee Notes list these factors:
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a
pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether the person has engaged in similar
conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on
the litigation process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained
in the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is
needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is
needed to deter similar activity in other litigation ....
Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Comm. Notes, in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at 80.
97. For instance, particular factors, such as whether the signer has legal training and
the individual's capacity to pay are exactly the kinds of considerations that courts ought to
consider in choosing sanctions.
98. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(3), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at
75-76. See also supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. For example, some of the factors
listed, such as the amount needed to deter, are clearly irrelevant or must be so considered.
These are the last two considerations listed in the factors enumerated in supra note 96.
99. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B), in Proposed Rules, supra note 54, at
76-77.
100. See id. Courts cannot order the payment of financial sanctions unless they issue
show cause orders before the case is settled or voluntarily dismissed. Id.
101. Some critics contended that courts had excessive flexibility to impose sanctions
sua sponte and that a few judges even abused their discretion. Statement of Judge Pointer,
Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991).
102. For example, it might have been advisable to include a safe harbor provision in
this subdivision like that in proposed Rule 11(c)(1)(A). See also supra notes 70-74 and ac-
companying text.
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C. Future Directions
The course of future action on the Committee's nascent propo-
sal for change in Rule 11 is currently unclear. The Committee for-
warded its suggestions promptly to the Standing Committee, which
made minor changes and circulated a preliminary draft of a pro-
posed amendment for public comment in August. 03 Once public
input is received and any necessary modifications are made, the
Standing Committee will send the proposal to the Judicial Confer-
ence; if that entity approves the efforts, the proposal will be sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court for its consideration. 04 Given the
Court's clearly articulated concern about the litigation explosion
and litigation abuse, it seems unlikely to disagree with what the
Standing Committee forwards. 105 If the Court subscribes to the
proposal that it receives, the Court must submit the proposal to
the Congress by May 1, 1993, and the proposal will become effec-
tive on December 1, 1993, unless Congress acts. 10 6
Should the proposal be approved at all levels, it could become
effective in December 1993.107 This prospect appears reasonably
likely because all participants that pass on the proposals, except
Congress, generally defer to the entities below them in the hierar-
chy. Significant public criticism of, or opposition to, the proposal
could lead the Advisory or Standing Committees to change their
work product, and that type of public input could well persuade
Congress to modify the proposal that it receives. 08
In short, it appears plausible that the Supreme Court and
Congress will soon agree to adopt a new Rule 11 that is quite simi-
lar to the proposal recently developed by the Advisory Committee.
Whether that type of provision should be promulgated as a new
103. See Proposed Rules, supra note 54; Letter from Judge Pointer, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Robert Keeton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure (June 13, 1991) (copy on file with author).
104. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2073, 2074 (1988).
105. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's end-of-the-year reports on the state of
the federal judiciary routinely express concern about the litigation explosion. See also supra
notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988).
107. Id. Accord Statement of Judge Pointer, Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (May 24, 1991).
108. Congress has been comparatively reluctant to act independently out of apparent
deference to the expertise of the Committee and concern over the cooperative, interbranch
character of the rules amending process. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 293, 337-40. But cf.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-20 (1982) (docu-
menting increased congressional willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and
amendments governing evidence and civil, criminal and appellate procedure). See generally
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975).
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Montana Rule 11 is considered below.
IV. SHOULD MONTANA ADOPT A NEW RULE?
A. Introduction
Reconsideration of amended Rule 11 at the federal level af-
fords an auspicious, occasion for reexamination of Montana Rule
11. Montana frequently follows rule revision developments in the
federal sphere, as it did in 1984 when modeling revision of Mon-
tana Rule 11 on the amendment of Federal Rule 11 a year earlier.
The controversial nature of the revision of Federal Rule 11 in 1983
and the acknowledgement that the amendment has created numer-
ous problems, however, should lead to analysis of Montana Rule 11
to ascertain whether it warrants additional change and, if so, what
modifications might be most efficacious.
The Montana Supreme Court -has issued relatively few Rule 11
opinions, and there apparently has been comparatively little Rule
11 activity in the state district courts.10 9 Nonetheless, the supreme
court has published more decisions recently, while Rule 11 activity
seems to be increasing in the trial courts.110 Moreover, much can
be learned from the problems that Rule 11 has created in the fed-
eral courts since 1983 and how those difficulties may be minimized
in Montana. Now, thus, is an opportune time to evaluate Montana
Rule 11, to anticipate problems that could arise in its application,
and to capitalize on the federal experience and proposals for
change at that level. Most important, it seems appropriate to as-
certain whether Montana Rule 11 might be improved through ad-
ditional revision while tailoring any revision of Montana Rule 11 to
the needs of the bench and bar of this state. For example, even if
the generally cordial relations that prevail in Montana among
judges and lawyers have minimized the problems that Montana
109. See State Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 248 Mont. 444, 813 P.2d 409 (1991);
Wise v. Sebena, 248 Mont. 32, 808 P.2d 494 (1991); Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 247 Mont.
244, 806 P.2d 503 (1991); Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215, 797 P.2d 200 (1990); Smith v.
Barrett, 242 Mont. 37, 788 P.2d 324 (1990); McCracken v. City of Chinook, 242 Mont. 21,
788 P.2d 892 (1990); D'Agostino v. Swanson, 240 Mont. 435, 784 P.2d 919 (1990); In re
Adoption of R.D.T., 239 Mont. 33, 778 P.2d 416 (1989); Bee Broadcasting Assocs. v. Reier,
236 Mont. 275, 769 P.2d 709 (1989); Easley v. Burlington N. R.R., 234 Mont. 290, 762 P.2d
870 (1988); Brown v. Jensen, 231 Mont. 340, 753 P.2d 870 (1988); Bauer v. Kar Prods., Inc.,
230 Mont. 422, 749 P.2d 1385 (1988); Searight v. Cimino, 230 Mont. 96, 748 P.2d 948 (1988);
State ex rel. Sorensen v. Roske, 229 Mont. 151, 745 P.2d 365 (1987); Gold Reserve Corp. v.
McCarty, 228 Mont. 512, 744 P.2d 160 (1987); Branstetter v. Beaumont Supper Club, Inc.,
224 Mont. 20, 727 P.2d 933 (1986); Schmidt v. Colonial Terrace Assocs., 223 Mont. 8, 723
P.2d 954 (1986). See also Nimmick v. Hart, 248 Mont. 1, 808 P.2d 481, 491 (1991) (sug-
gesting district court consider Rule 11 sanctions).
110. See supra note 109.
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Rule 11 could create, it may well be advisable to take preventive
measures before the Rule erodes civility in the state, as Rule 11
apparently has at the federal level."'
B. Possible Repeal of Montana Rule 11
One important question that should be addressed initially is
whether there actually was a need for the 1984 amendment of
Montana Rule 11. Although that revision was said to be necessi-
tated by problems similar to those that led to change in Federal
Rule 11, there was then, and continues to be, in Montana, nothing
that could fairly be characterized as a litigation explosion. More-
over, there is little litigation abuse that cannot be treated effec-
tively with other mechanisms, minimal incivility in the bench and
bar, and less need to expedite dispute resolution than in the fed-
eral courts. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider seriously the
repeal of current Montana Rule 11 and reinstitution of the pre-
1984 formulation, which required a finding of bad faith.112 If that
proposal would effect too dramatic a change in the current legal
culture or send the wrong signal, there at least should be reconsid-
eration of Montana Rule 11 with an eye toward selecting those as-
pects of the present and proposed Federal Rule 11 and state
equivalents of Rule 11 that would be best suited for application in
Montana.
C. Amendment of Current Montana Rule 11
1. Rule Violations
It may be advisable to reinstitute a subjective/bad faith re-
quirement for Rule violations, as some states have done and writ-
ers have suggested."' Attorneys and litigants would experience less
difficulty satisfying this type of requirement and would subject less
of their activity to the Rule, thereby reducing the provision's invo-
cation. Return to a subjective/bad faith standard would move in a
different direction than the federal analogue, which retains an ob-
jective/reasonableness standard while seeking to increase the re-
111. See Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d
Cir. 1988); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); COMMITTEE ON
CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INTERIM REPORT 20-21 (Comm. Print
Apr. 1991).
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824 (1989); PA. R. CIV. P. 1023 (1990); LaFrance,
Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 354 (1988); Tobias,
supra note 7, at 522-24.
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sponsibilities of lawyers and parties to the court through imposi-
tion of a continuing duty.
114
If Montana Rule 11 retains an objective standard, serious con-
sideration should be accorded to several important aspects of the
proposal to amend the analogous requirements of Federal Rule 11.
First, Montana Rule 11 should not impose a continuing obligation,
which is the most problematic aspect of the proposed Federal
Rule. Lawyers and litigants would have great difficulty complying
with such a duty. The obligation also could multiply the number of
Rule 11 inquiries, for example, with questions regarding the ade-
quacy of timing and notice, and could lead to potential abuse in
the Rule's invocation.
The provision for safe harbors could pose some similar
problems, especially as to timing, notice and abuse; however, these
disadvantages probably would be outweighed by the potential ben-
efits. Safe harbors may provide a safety valve for civil rights plain-
tiffs and for other litigants and lawyers who pursue unpopular,
controversial or untested theories or who possess relatively few re-
sources. Another helpful provision included in the proposed Fed-
eral Rule recognizes the need for discovery to prove certain factual
allegations.
Two new provisions added to the requirements governing legal
assertions in the proposed Federal Rule 11 could prove problem-
atic and should not be imported into Montana Rule 11. One is sub-
stitution of "nonfrivolous" for "good faith" as the adjective modi-
fying legal argument. Reliance on that term would unduly
emphasize product, engender greater inconsistency, provide less
clarity and complicate efforts of lawyers and litigants to comply
with the Rule. The proposed Federal provision also imposes a duty
of candor, which might help courts but would burden attorneys
and parties." 5
2. Sanctions Imposed
Montana Rule 11 also should make the imposition of sanctions
discretionary rather than mandatory. This would represent a re-
turn to earlier practice and would afford courts greater flexibility
in treating Rule violations, while providing offenders somewhat
114. See supra notes 54, 56-67 and accompanying text.
115. It would help courts, for example, by identifying early in the litigation legal con-
tentions that may have marginal validity. It would burden lawyers and litigants, especially
those with limited resources or who pursue nontraditional legal theories, for example, by
requiring them to spend additional time and money developing their legal theories and by
potentially prejudicing their cases. See generally supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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more protection from sanctions. The Federal Advisory Committee
rejected this possibility because Committee members believed that
it would send the wrong signal-that they were insufficiently seri-
ous about curbing litigation abuse."'
The Committee also seemed to have four principal objectives
in providing judges guidance for imposing appropriate sanctions:
emphasizing deterrence as Rule 11's major purpose and the availa-
bility of nonmonetary sanctions, while deemphasizing Rule 11's
compensatory goal and awards of financial assessments, particu-
larly of attorney's fees.117 The Montana Rule should incorporate
these four objectives, and this can be achieved by employing mea-
sures similar to those that the Committee employed. The relative
emphases to be accorded deterrence, compensation, nonmonetary
and financial sanctions could be treated by expressly providing for
each in the Rule's text. For emphasis, nonmonetary sanctions, and
a specific enumeration of possibilities, should be explicitly pre-
scribed in the text.118 Correspondingly, financial awards might be
downplayed by deleting them from the text or by conditioning
such assessments on serious misbehavior or a finding of compelling
need to deter."'
3. Additional Provisions
The proposed Federal Rule specifically includes procedures for
sanctioning on the court's own initiative. This was intended to reg-
ularize sua sponte activity at the federal level, as to which there
were some allegations of abuse. 20 This apparently has not been
problematic in Montana; thus explicit prescription may be
unnecessary.
The Advisory Committee retained the abuse-of-discretion
standard for appellate review of all district court decisionmaking
that the United States Supreme Court recently articulated. 2' Such
a deferential standard could prove problematic for review of Rule
11 decisionmaking by trial courts that apply the Rule too vigor-
ously, although this also seems to have posed minimal difficulty in
Montana.
In short, Montana should anticipate problems with Rule 11
116. See Advisory Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991) (tapes of
meeting available from Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.).
117. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
118. See generally supra notes 83, 93-95 and accompanying text.
119. See generally supra notes 81, 84, 88-92 and accompanying text.
120. See generally supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
121. See generally supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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that have occurred at the federal level and act promptly to change
Montana Rule 11 before similar difficulties arise here. Because the
complications, such as litigation abuse, at which Federal Rule 11
was aimed were never very widespread and continue to be limited
'in Montana, return to the pre-1984 formulation may well be advis-
able. If that change is too drastic, the Montana rule revisors should
seriously consider the specific suggestions above. Adoption of any
of them should constitute improvement.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Advisory Committee has responded to substantial
criticism of Federal Rule 11 by proposing significant change in the
provision. These developments in the federal sphere afford an ap-
propriate occasion for the reconsideration of Montana Rule 11. By
capitalizing on the federal experience, Montana can minimize the
worst aspects of Rule 11 and maximize its best dimensions. The
rule revisors should seriously consider amending Montana Rule 11
in ways that will be effective and that are tailored to the local legal
culture. This might prompt return to a pre-1984 version of the
Rule or at least substantial revision that adopts the best compo-
nents of the Advisory Committee's work while eschewing the rest.
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